Operations

The Business Plot

In 1933, a bond salesman tried to persuade Smedley Butler to make a speech at an American Legion convention. The speech favored a return to the gold standard. The salesman offered to pay for veterans to attend and call for Butler from the audience, making a prepared intervention look like a demand from ordinary soldiers.

A year later, according to Butler, the same man wanted something much larger: an organization of half a million veterans, led by the retired Marine general, that would give a new executive official the power to govern behind President Franklin Roosevelt. The proposal came wrapped in assurances that it would support the President and save the country. Butler understood it as a route to fascism.

The salesman, Gerald C. MacGuire, denied making that offer. A congressional committee nevertheless concluded that an attempt had been made to establish a fascist organization. Its investigation found money MacGuire had difficulty accounting for and letters describing his interest in European veterans’ movements. The inquiry treated the allegation as serious.

The surviving record leaves a harder question about the people supposedly behind MacGuire. Some paid him, some employed him, and others appeared only in his conversations. The committee had to determine how far his authority extended: whose money he was spending, which proposals they had approved, and whether his promises of support would survive being put to the people he named.

A speech someone else had written

Butler had spent more than thirty-three years on active duty in the Marine Corps and received the Medal of Honor twice. By the time of these approaches he was retired, with a public reputation and connections among veterans. A private political organizer could buy advertisements or rent a hall. Butler offered something harder to purchase: soldiers who might listen because they trusted him.

In his testimony, Butler traced the approaches to about July 1933. MacGuire and Bill Doyle, an American Legion official, visited his home. They spoke of dislodging the men who controlled the Legion and helping its ordinary members. Butler shared their dislike of the leadership, but could not reconcile that appeal with the other purposes emerging in the conversation.

First they suggested arranging for him to attend the Chicago convention as a delegate from Hawaii, where he did not live. He refused. Then came a plan to bring two or three hundred veterans from his part of Pennsylvania, distribute them through the audience, and have them start a demonstration demanding his speech. Their travel and accommodation would be paid. The speech was already written.

The organizers wanted the authority of an apparently spontaneous veterans’ demand while supplying its audience, speaker, and words. Butler would be lending his name to a position he had not chosen.

Gold was the real subject of the proposed speech. Roosevelt’s changes to monetary policy had alarmed people who wanted wealth and obligations to retain their old relationship to gold. MacGuire presented the issue as protection for soldiers: a veterans’ bonus should have sound value rather than be paid in depreciated paper. Butler heard an attempt to use the bonus as an inducement to serve someone else’s financial interest.

The argument tried to join interests that Butler thought were at odds. A veteran waiting for a payment wanted money he could use. A wealthy opponent of Roosevelt’s monetary policy wanted an influential organization to endorse his preferred currency rules. MacGuire promised that the second demand would protect the first. Butler asked why men with money to spend on this campaign had not made payment of the bonus itself their priority.

He also doubted that the visitors could pay the expenses they offered. They showed him a bankbook with large deposits. Later, at a Newark hotel around the beginning of September, Butler said, MacGuire produced a mass of thousand-dollar bills and threw them on the bed. There was $18,000, MacGuire told him, for expenses. Butler refused it. He worried that accepting identifiable large bills would leave him vulnerable to the people providing them.

For the moment, Butler was being asked to influence a convention. The proposed half-million-man organization came the following year, after MacGuire had gone to Europe.

The man who could pay

Butler insisted on meeting a principal. MacGuire named Robert Sterling Clark, a wealthy man whom Butler remembered from military service in China. Clark subsequently visited Butler’s home and tried to persuade him to go to Chicago. Butler could now ask a man with money what he wanted the soldiers to do.

According to Butler, Clark explained that he had $30 million and would spend half to preserve the other half. He wanted veterans to support restoration of the gold standard. He also offered arrangements for the journey and accommodation. Butler refused to have soldiers mobilized for that purpose. When Clark suggested that the mortgage on Butler’s house could be taken care of, Butler regarded the offer as an attempt to buy him.

The $15 million Clark reportedly offered to risk was part of this argument about gold. His willingness to finance political work was already evident; whether he would also fund an armed organization became a separate question when MacGuire returned with a different proposal.

The convention adopted a gold-standard resolution without Butler’s appearance. MacGuire continued approaching him about public events, including a dinner at which Butler would appear with Al Smith. Butler saw the danger of having his reputation attached to a political cause through a photograph and a paid speaking engagement. He repeatedly refused the uses proposed for him.

Butler kept listening, although he remained uncertain about MacGuire. He even considered whether the salesman was extracting money from Clark while exaggerating what he could deliver. He could take an approach seriously while doubting the salesman’s account of his authority.

A government behind the President

The more serious proposal emerged after MacGuire traveled in Europe. Butler described a conversation at Philadelphia’s Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in August 1934. MacGuire said he had studied the political use of veterans abroad. The German and Italian arrangements, he said, did not quite suit the United States. France offered the useful model.

He described a large veterans’ organization whose members could exert influence well beyond their own numbers. In America, Butler would lead an organization of 500,000 men. Many were unemployed or struggling; the scheme included claims that money could be found to support them. Their loyalty to a respected general would supply a political force outside the ordinary machinery of a party or an election.

MacGuire initially called the purpose support for Roosevelt. The President was overworked, he said, and needed relief from the detail of governing. A new official would take that work over. Butler remembered the proposed title as Secretary of General Affairs or Secretary of General Welfare; he was uncertain which. He recalled its powers more clearly than its name.

Roosevelt would remain in place while someone else exercised executive authority. Publicity about the President’s health would help make the arrangement acceptable. Behind it would stand the veterans’ organization and its capacity to compel agreement. The reassuring language of assistance concealed the transfer of power.

An adviser helping a President has authority the President can withdraw. The official described to Butler would be sustained by a private mass organization organized around a general. Once that force became the reason the President had to accept an arrangement, the President’s freedom to dismiss the supposed assistant would be doubtful. Retaining the title of President could preserve a familiar appearance while changing who governed.

Butler said he answered that if this was a way to bring in fascism, he would find another half million men to fight it. MacGuire promised substantial resources: $3 million to start, with $300 million available if necessary. Those sums did not appear as an organization fund in the committee’s published financial findings.

The projected membership also remained a claim. The record does not supply a roster of 500,000 recruits, a chain of command, transport arrangements, or an agreed supply of weapons. Butler’s acceptance could have made recruitment easier, but his popularity did not place every veteran under his orders. The scale of the promised organization tells us what he was being invited to attempt, not how many men were already waiting to march.

A second listener

Butler brought in the journalist Paul Comly French to investigate. He went to MacGuire’s office at 52 Broadway in New York on September 13, 1934, and had his own conversation. He testified that he made a memorandum at a typewriter immediately afterward.

French’s account was more explicit about the proposed politics. MacGuire said a fascist government was needed to save the country from communists, and that soldiers were the people capable of doing it. He described Butler as the ideal leader and spoke of a dictator who would restore order. French also reported proposals for camps for unemployed people and registration measures to stop agitators moving between them.

In French’s account, fascism had specific uses: a private veterans’ force would subordinate elected authority and impose coercive measures on people identified as threats to the existing economic system.

French said MacGuire used Mussolini’s relationship with the Italian king as an analogy: Roosevelt could be retained while another figure took power. The same arrangement had appeared in Butler’s conversation: an elected leader left in place but deprived of effective power.

French was pursuing Butler’s suspicions, so the investigation was not independent in its origin. But his evidence added a conversation that Butler had not attended. MacGuire now had to deny an account from a second person who said he had heard the proposal directly, rather than merely repeating what Butler had told him.

French also exposed the weakness of some of the supposed endorsements. MacGuire displayed a letter he attributed to a former American Legion commander, Louis Johnson. French admitted that he had not read it. When asked about the use of impressive names, he agreed that they could have been intended to impress him. A letter placed across a desk could lend credibility without its contents ever being examined.

What the bank records added

The House inquiry was conducted by a special committee chaired by John McCormack, with Samuel Dickstein as vice-chairman. It heard Butler and French, questioned MacGuire under oath, and obtained financial evidence. Its public statement of November 24, 1934, is unusually useful because it describes checks the investigators could make outside the competing recollections.

MacGuire acknowledged receiving $30,000 from Clark and another $1,000 from Walter E. Frew for the sound-money committee. He said these contributions came after the Chicago convention. They established financing for the currency effort, without identifying the money used at every earlier meeting. The committee also examined other transactions involving MacGuire, Clark, and Clark’s associate Albert Christmas, including cash and substantial letters of credit. These movements were poorly explained.

A letter of credit allowed its holder to draw funds through a bank. The committee followed money used to buy those instruments, the draws against them, and the explanations offered afterward. MacGuire claimed that he had converted letters of credit into cash and returned the unspent money to Christmas, despite paying a premium to obtain the instruments. That gave investigators transactions to compare with MacGuire’s answers even when there was no receipt showing a final political expense.

MacGuire said some funds concerned bond transactions. Investigators found no corresponding bond purchases to account for the money in question. They asked about cash kept in a safe, payments and withdrawals, and the absence of receipts. The committee’s statement described tens of thousands of dollars beyond the acknowledged sound-money fund for which it still wanted a satisfactory explanation.

One check concerned MacGuire’s whereabouts. He said he had remained in Chicago over a period surrounding the Legion convention. Bank evidence placed him in New York during that interval. A bank employee described issuing letters of credit there on September 23, paid for with thirteen thousand-dollar bills. The large denominations had a practical significance: they were part of a transaction an outside witness could identify, rather than only cash Butler remembered seeing.

The contradiction damaged MacGuire’s reliability. His denials could no longer be weighed as though the committee had found his other answers consistently accurate. It also showed that the money behind the earlier political work was substantial and that he was concealing or failing to explain parts of its use.

Still, the bank records did not turn every unexplained dollar into army funding. The investigators had records for particular transfers and withdrawals, together with disputed accounts of their purposes. A financial account of the gold campaign could corroborate Butler’s description of a well-funded approach without establishing who had approved the later proposal for executive power.

At the end of its November statement, the committee said it was awaiting the return of Clark and Christmas for further explanation. Its published account left unfinished business. That ending is easily lost when the investigation is retold as either complete vindication of every allegation or a general’s story dismissed without inquiry.

Letters from Europe

MacGuire’s letters supplied a different kind of corroboration. They were written before Butler’s public accusation and described the organizations MacGuire said he had been examining abroad. The committee could compare the reported conversation with his own contemporary interests.

In a March 6, 1934 letter, MacGuire described attending a meeting of the French Croix de Feu. He admired its recruits and portrayed its veterans as patriotic people who would save France in a crisis. His presentation combined praise for their political strength with assurances that they stood above ordinary party politics and protected freedom. Another letter discussed the possibility that communists could be made the scapegoat for a military coup in France.

MacGuire praised men who supposedly represented the country more faithfully than politicians did. Their wartime service gave them, in this account, a special entitlement to intervene. Calling that intervention national salvation helped make a claim to power sound like an obligation.

In its February 15, 1935 final report, the committee stated that there was evidence of an attempt to establish a fascist organization. It said the efforts had been discussed and planned, and might have been put into execution if the financial backers considered it expedient. The committee believed an attempt had been made.

The report then identified the evidential problem. It said it had verified Butler’s pertinent statements except the direct suggestion to create the organization; it regarded MacGuire’s correspondence with Clark as corroboration for that suggestion. The letters supported the committee’s judgment because they showed an interest and activity matching the reported pitch. They documented the European study; the proposed American organization was described by the witnesses.

The report also said it had no evidence connecting the effort to fascist activity in any European country. MacGuire’s study of foreign movements had not established an organizational link to them. The danger described in the testimony could have been an American project undertaken for American purposes.

Names the inquiry did not establish

Clark was a real financial principal. MacGuire’s employment at Grayson M.-P. Murphy & Co. was also real. These relationships gave investigators people and transactions to examine. Other names entered through MacGuire’s claims about possible support, or through witnesses’ interpretations of those claims.

Some passages about those names were omitted from the published testimony and appeared in John L. Spivak’s reporting in New Masses in January and February 1935. A later transcription restores such passages in a different color. One restored passage has French reporting MacGuire’s suggestion that arms could be obtained from Remington on credit through the Du Ponts. French also reported names of financial figures MacGuire said he could approach, while acknowledging the references might mean little.

This is evidence about what French said MacGuire told him. It is not an arms contract or testimony from a Du Pont director authorizing one. Treating all the names in an intermediary’s pitch as consenting participants would let that intermediary determine the membership of a conspiracy simply by naming prominent people.

The American Liberty League presents a related problem. Butler associated the publicly emerging organization with MacGuire’s description of an organization that would defend the Constitution. Opposition to Roosevelt and overlapping social connections made the association plausible to him. The committee did not establish that the League’s governing body had collectively approved the veterans’ army. Membership in a public opposition group cannot supply that missing decision.

In November the committee said that references to several prominent men were hearsay and did not warrant summoning them on that basis. That decision left leads unexplored. The published finding nevertheless stopped well short of accusing those men of participation.

Butler had offered another possibility: MacGuire might have been working wealthy patrons and prospective recruits against one another, enlarging his importance to each. He might have had genuine funds for one political campaign and exaggerated his mandate for another. Such conduct could coexist with authoritarian intentions. It would change how much organization and support stood behind the offer.

The letters make a wholly innocent misunderstanding difficult to accept. The financial contradictions make MacGuire’s blanket denial unpersuasive. Neither resolves exactly how far Clark or anyone else had authorized him to go in 1934. That is the most consequential unfinished question in the case.

Publication and its limits

The committee published a substantial account of the affair while withholding parts of the testimony. The committee issued its detailed public statement in November 1934, published hearing material, and reported to the House in February 1935. Spivak’s articles challenged the omissions while the affair was still recent.

Spivak went further, treating the omissions as evidence that the committee was protecting powerful financial interests. His articles are valuable records of that contemporary challenge. Their accusations about the people behind the committee require evidence beyond the fact that passages were left out. The omitted material included secondhand claims whose publication could itself have suggested a degree of confirmation the inquiry had not achieved.

Ridicule also shaped the public reception. Time’s December 3, 1934 article opened with an imagined future march on Washington, then gave considerable space to denials and mockery. Yet it also reported that the committee was continuing its work and might hear further witnesses. Even this dismissive article did not describe an inquiry already closed. Its tone helped make Butler’s allegation sound absurd before the remaining evidence had been settled.

The affair produced no criminal trial in which prosecutors had to establish the alleged agreement, its participants, and their acts before a jury. A congressional finding could condemn a dangerous attempt without completing that task. The absence of prosecution left both the limits of the scheme and the responsibility of possible backers unresolved. It does not, by itself, reveal a private bargain between Roosevelt and the men suspected of financing it.

Butler’s refusal mattered because the proposal depended on borrowing his authority. His name could have drawn attention, recruits, and respectability to men who had money but lacked his following. The proposed veterans’ force would also have displaced the judgment of the veterans themselves: their service and loyalty were being offered to prospective backers before the men had agreed to any such purpose. He refused that use and made the approach available for investigation. His evidence brought the proposed use of that authority before the committee.

In 1933, paid supporters were supposed to call Butler to a platform so that someone else’s prepared speech would appear to come from the soldiers. In 1934, according to the testimony, his reputation was again to make an externally financed project look like the veterans’ own demand. The proposed power had grown from influence at a convention to authority over the President. Butler would not supply the name that made either arrangement credible.

Connections

Edward Bernays & The Engineering of ConsentCorporate interests in publicity can be examined alongside particular political plans. Client overlaps and similar techniques do not establish that Bernays operated a propaganda wing of the alleged plot or that the two belonged to one operational architecture.Skull & BonesThe inherited connection concerns wealthy American social and financial networks. The Business Plot evidence examined here does not establish participation by Skull and Bones, Prescott Bush, or Brown Brothers Harriman; proximity within an elite is insufficient to identify organizers.The Deep StateThe inquiry investigated an alleged attempt to move executive power behind a private veterans’ organization. Its positive findings, unexplained payments, selective publication, and unfinished questions about sponsors illuminate problems of accountability without establishing a unified permanent establishment or a secret bargain preventing prosecution.The Shadow EliteClark’s financing and MacGuire’s employment at Murphy’s firm supply documented relationships through which private money reached political work. The essay distinguishes those relationships from prospective support MacGuire claimed and from authorization of the later veterans’ organization.The Federal ReserveOpposition to Roosevelt’s gold policy provided the subject of the funded 1933 convention campaign and subsequent sound-money work. This connects the affair to monetary politics; it does not establish Federal Reserve authorization of an armed organization or make every unexplained payment coup funding.Operation PaperclipBoth subjects involve private influence and government decisions, but the Business Plot record examined here establishes no personnel or operational lineage to the later recruitment of German scientists. The inherited connection through Brown Brothers Harriman and Prescott Bush is unsupported in this case.

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